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External powers
Parties outside EtherFamily can affect its markets. None of them can be overruled by EtherFamily's contracts.
Design · not deployedValues on this page come from the design. Deployed addresses and settings: Contract addresses; live state: Status.
The permanent lock and the fixed launch terms bind EtherFamily. They do not bind Uniswap, the issuers of the assets a market trades against, the perp venue or the price feeds. Every market names them:
Who can change this market
EtherFamily can change settings for future launches through a 48-hour timelock, plus a guardian that can pause new launches. Through the same timelock it can also change which instant-exit buffer (perp shares) or issuer-screening adapter (stocks) EtherFamily's router uses for this market; that never moves funds or changes amounts. It cannot change this market's price, fee, split, fee recipient or locked position. Outside parties can still affect it: the issuer of the quote asset, Uniswap governance and price-feed operators. For perp-share markets EtherFamily also administers the vault behind the quote asset: see below.
Summary
| Party | Power | Delay | What EtherFamily does |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniswap governance | A protocol fee of up to 0.1% per trade direction on any v4 pool | A vote, then a 2-day timelock | Disclosed; trade previews read each pool's current value |
| Ondo (stock tokens) | Pause, block addresses, sanctions checks, replace compliance rules, upgrade, burn | None; 2 hours for upgrades and burns | Disclosed; per-market fee balances; screening in EtherFamily's paths; the guardian can stop new launches |
| Tether (USDT) | Blacklist and burn; a transfer fee switch, currently off | None | Transfers are measured and a fee makes them revert; disclosed for perp vaults |
| Circle (USDC) | Blacklist and pause (not analysed in the research) | None | Alerts; the guardian can stop new USDC launches |
| Synthetix operators | Freeze, delay, redirect or upgrade away pooled collateral; suspend or close accounts; change fees and funding | None; no notice needed under its terms | Distress gate, size caps, wind-down, disclosure. Perps are disabled |
| Chainlink feed operators | The price values EtherFamily reads | None | Freshness and bound checks; the guardian can disable a quote; the timelock can replace a feed |
Uniswap governance
Uniswap v4's PoolManager, which holds every EtherFamily market, is owned by the Uniswap governance timelock (2-day delay). Through it, governance sets the protocol fee policy for v4 pools Observed on-chain.
- The fee can reach 0.1% per trade direction on any pool, EtherFamily's included. Once governance has set a policy, anyone can apply it to a given pool.
- At the research block the policy gave pools like EtherFamily's a protocol fee of 0 Observed on-chain. On a mainnet fork, a governance change to 0.1% made a 1,000 USDC buy pay 0.99 USDC of protocol fee on top of the unchanged 10 USDC launch fee Test-proven.
- It cannot touch the locked position or the launch fees, and EtherFamily's hook cannot block it.
Separately, Uniswap's own interface routes trades to hooked pools like EtherFamily's only after a discretionary review. That affects where a token can be traded from, not its funds.
Issuers of quote assets
Ondo Global Markets (stock tokens)
Issuer powers
The issuer can pause the stock token or block addresses at any time, and can change the token's code for all its stock tokens after a 2-hour delay. A pause or block can stop trading in this market and stop fee and reward claims. EtherFamily's permanent liquidity lock does not protect against that.
The details, keys and delays are on Stock quotes.
Tether (USDT)
Tether can blacklist an address, including a perp vault or the venue's pooled deposit contract, and burn its balance; USDT also has a transfer fee switch that is set to zero Observed on-chain. EtherFamily measures every incoming transfer and rejects one that arrives short, so a fee would stop those paths rather than be absorbed silently. USDT matters for conversion routes and as perp vault collateral.
Circle (USDC)
USDC can be blacklisted and paused by its issuer. These controls were not analysed in the research Hypothesis. A frozen address cannot receive USDC from a USDC market or its fee claims.
Native ETH
Native ETH has no issuer and no one who can freeze it.
The perp venue's operators
Venue custody
Collateral is held by the venue's deposit contract, which the venue's operators can pause, upgrade or pay out without a timelock, and whose withdrawals have been paused for up to 15 days at a time. The venue's terms let it suspend accounts at its discretion and say that assets may then be lost. Exits can be delayed.
Synthetix's operators can freeze, delay or redirect the pooled collateral, deny or dispute withdrawals, and upgrade the deposit contract or the permission registry without a timelock Observed on-chain. Nothing EtherFamily builds can prevent that: vaults respond by closing deposits, holding redemptions during distress and, if it lasts, winding down. Perp vault shares
The venue's terms add to those powers Vendor-documented: it may suspend or discontinue its services, or close an account, at its discretion and without notice, and says that assets may then be lost; it may change fees and funding at any time; its liability is capped at the greater of $100 or six months of fees; and disputes go to individual, confidential arbitration under Panamanian law. The venue's terms
Chainlink price feeds
EtherFamily reads Chainlink feeds for opening prices of ETH and USDC launches, USD marks, perp vault report checks and the instant buffer. A stale or wrong value can:
- set the opening price of a new launch, within the registry's bounds and the creator's own value limits (it never affects a market after it opens);
- stop vault settlement and the buffer, which refuse stale prices;
- make USD marks unavailable, rather than wrong, when a feed is older than its limit.
The guardian can disable a quote for new launches at once, and the timelock can replace a feed. The current age of each feed is on the status page.
Sources: EtherFamily contracts specification §11 (external rows); research on Uniswap v4 §6 (observed at block 26,085,700 and fork-tested), on Ondo stock tokens §8, on Synthetix Mainnet (custody and roles) and on Chainlink feeds; the clause review of Synthetix's Exchange Terms (2026-09-30).